How to password tester for security & compliance workflows
- Step 1Open the tester on a trusted machine — Use archive-password-tester on the operator's own device. Because it runs client-side, regulated data is never transmitted during verification.
- Step 2Load the encrypted ZIP — Drop the single encrypted
.zip. First confirm it is actually encrypted with encrypted-archive-detector if the encryption status is uncertain. - Step 3Enter the agreed password — Type the password that was shared out-of-band into the masked field. Verification uses exactly this value — no defaults are tried.
- Step 4Run the verification — The tool decrypts only the first encrypted entry. No part of the payload is written to disk, so sensitive contents are not exposed during the check.
- Step 5Record the verdict — Capture the Verdict and Tested entry.
correctconfirms access;incorrectflags a password mismatch to resolve before transmission or storage. - Step 6File the JSON as evidence — Download
<name>-password-test.jsonand attach it to the deliverable's ticket or evidence pack as a timestamped verification record.
Compliance verification scenarios
Where a fast, local, non-extracting password check fits into a security/compliance workflow.
| Scenario | Risk if skipped | What the verdict gives you |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-send check on an encrypted PII export | Recipient receives an un-openable archive; re-send exposes data again | correct confirms the agreed password works before transmission |
| Inbound audit-evidence pack | You store an archive you can't open later | correct before you commit it to storage/KMS |
| Breach-notification bundle to a regulator | Missed deadline if the regulator can't open it | Saved JSON verdict as proof the password was verified |
| Encrypted backup handed to a third party | Backup is useless without a confirmed password | correct + escrowed password = recoverable later |
Privacy & handling properties
Why this is safe to run on regulated data — confirmed against the tool's implementation.
| Property | Behavior | Why it matters for compliance |
|---|---|---|
| Data location | 100% in-browser (no server path) | Verification creates no new copy on a third-party host |
| Payload exposure | Only the first encrypted entry is decrypted, in memory | The full sensitive payload is never extracted to disk |
| Mutation | Read-only — archive is never modified | Chain of custody / original integrity preserved |
| Output | JSON { filename, testedEntry, verdict } | Timestamp-able evidence record for an audit trail |
| Recovery | None — verifier only, no brute-force | Policy must require password escrow; lost AES = unrecoverable |
Cookbook
Verification workflows for sensitive deliverables. Verdicts are the literal strings the tool emits, and filenames/entries are illustrative of regulated bundles.
Pre-send check before mailing a PII export
Confirm the recipient's agreed password opens the export before you transmit it — so you never ship an un-openable archive containing regulated data.
Deliverable: gdpr-export-acme.zip (AES-256)
Agreed password (shared via signed channel): "Acme-DPA-2026!"
Report:
{
"filename": "gdpr-export-acme.zip",
"testedEntry": "subjects/records.csv",
"verdict": "correct"
}
Safe to transmit.Catch a sender typo before it leaves the building
The password set during packaging had a stray character. Caught locally, it never reaches the regulator.
Deliverable: breach-notice-2026-06.zip
Password the team thinks they set: "Notice#June"
Report:
{
"filename": "breach-notice-2026-06.zip",
"testedEntry": "timeline.pdf",
"verdict": "incorrect"
}
Re-package with the correct password BEFORE sending.Verify an inbound audit pack before storage
An auditor sends an encrypted evidence bundle and the password out-of-band. Confirm it matches before committing the archive to long-term storage.
Inbound: q2-audit-evidence.zip
Out-of-band password: "AUD-Q2-7731"
Report:
{
"filename": "q2-audit-evidence.zip",
"testedEntry": "controls/iso27001.xlsx",
"verdict": "correct"
}
Commit to evidence store with the verified password.Confirm encryption is real before verifying
A 'password-protected' deliverable turned out to ship plaintext entries — the verifier flags that there is nothing to test, which is itself a finding.
Deliverable: vendor-handoff.zip
Password tried: "shared-secret"
Report:
{
"filename": "vendor-handoff.zip",
"testedEntry": null,
"verdict": "no encrypted entries found in archive"
}
Finding: deliverable is NOT encrypted. Reject and request a re-package.Evidence record for the ticket
Attach the saved verdict JSON to the deliverable's compliance ticket so the verification is auditable.
$ cat gdpr-export-acme-password-test.json
{
"filename": "gdpr-export-acme.zip",
"testedEntry": "subjects/records.csv",
"verdict": "correct"
}
# attached to TICKET-4821 as verification evidenceEdge cases and what actually happens
Deliverable ships plaintext, not encrypted
Compliance findingVerdict no encrypted entries found in archive with testedEntry: null means the 'protected' deliverable is actually unencrypted. Treat as a finding and request a proper encrypted re-package; confirm with encrypted-archive-detector.
Password lost, no escrow
UnrecoverableThis tool verifies, it does not recover. A lost AES password cannot be brute-forced feasibly. Policy must require escrow of every deliverable password (e.g. in a vault) up front.
Mismatched out-of-band password
incorrectIf the shared password yields incorrect, the channel transmitted the wrong value or it was mistyped. Re-confirm via the signed/out-of-band channel before storing the archive.
Verifying does not expose the payload
By designOnly the first encrypted entry is decrypted, in memory, and never written to disk. You confirm access without extracting regulated contents — safe to run on sensitive bundles.
Damaged deliverable
errorAn error: <message> verdict (not incorrect) usually means corruption, not a wrong password. Request re-transmission or attempt corrupted-zip-repair; document the failure.
7z/RAR deliverable
Unsupported formatThis tool checks ZIP only. For 7z/RAR-encrypted deliverables, verify with the appropriate native tool and record that separately. Prefer ZIP+AES for deliverables you want to verify here.
Deliverable over tier limit
413 too largeLarge evidence packs may exceed the free 50 MB / 500-entry cap. Pro/Pro-media/Developer tiers raise this to 500 MB / 2 GB and up to 500,000 entries.
Run on an untrusted machine
PolicyAlthough nothing is uploaded, the password is typed into a browser on whatever device you use. Run verification only on a trusted, managed endpoint per your handling policy.
Original archive must stay untouched
PreservedThe operation is read-only — the deliverable is never modified, so chain of custody and original-file hashes are preserved. Pair with checksum-generator for a custody hash.
Mixed-password multi-entry archive
ExpectedOnly the first encrypted entry is tested. If a deliverable used different passwords per entry (rare and discouraged), the verdict reflects the first entry only — flag such archives as non-standard.
Frequently asked questions
Does verifying expose the sensitive contents?
No. Only the first encrypted entry is decrypted, in memory, to confirm the password — the payload is never extracted to disk. You verify access without exposing the data.
Is the archive uploaded to verify it?
No. The tool runs entirely in the browser. The encrypted deliverable and the password never leave the operator's machine, which is why it is safe to run on regulated data.
Can I keep the verdict as audit evidence?
Yes. Download <name>-password-test.json containing { filename, testedEntry, verdict } and attach it to the deliverable's ticket or evidence pack as a verification record.
Can it recover a lost deliverable password?
No — it is a verifier, not a recovery or brute-force tool. A lost AES password is not feasibly recoverable, so your policy must require escrowing every deliverable password up front.
What if the deliverable isn't actually encrypted?
You'll get no encrypted entries found in archive with testedEntry: null. That is a compliance finding — the deliverable shipped plaintext. Confirm with encrypted-archive-detector.
Does it support AES-256?
Yes. AES and legacy ZipCrypto entries in ZIP archives are both supported; zip.js detects the entry's method automatically. Prefer AES for compliance deliverables.
Can it verify 7z or RAR deliverables?
No. It checks ZIP archives only. For 7z/RAR, use the appropriate native tool and document that verification separately.
Does it modify the deliverable?
No. The operation is strictly read-only, preserving the original file's integrity and chain of custody. Pair it with checksum-generator for a custody hash.
How big a deliverable can I verify?
Free tier: 50 MB / 500 entries. Pro: 500 MB / 50,000 entries. Pro-media: 2 GB / 500,000 entries. Developer: 2 GB / 500,000 entries / unlimited files. The full central directory is read, so entry count matters.
What does an 'error:' verdict mean for a deliverable?
It indicates a non-password failure — typically corruption. Request re-transmission, document the failure, and optionally try corrupted-zip-repair.
Is it safe to run on PII?
Running it is local and read-only and does not extract the payload, so verification itself does not create a new copy or exposure. Still run it only on a trusted, managed endpoint per policy.
Should I verify before sending or only on receipt?
Both. Sender-side verification catches typos before an un-openable archive reaches a client or regulator; recipient-side verification confirms an out-of-band password before you store the data.
Privacy first
Every JAD Archive tool runs entirely in your browser using fflate, @zip.js/zip.js, and the libarchive WASM bridge. Your archives never leave your device — verified by zero outbound network requests during processing.